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         Analysis of Government Policies, Institutions and Inward Foreign Direct 
Investment: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa 
Abstract  
This paper examines the effects of government policies and institutions on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows in sub-Saharan African context using both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. On the quantitative approach, we 
analysed the effects of institutions on FDI using two statistical techniques: CCR 
and FMOLS over the period of 1984–2012. We find that political instability, 
democratic accountability and investment risk have significant impact on inward 
FDI in Nigeria. Using a trend analysis, our results provide evidence to suggest 
that liberal government investment policies have positive influence on FDI 
inflows. Our qualitative analysis over the 1962–2012 period supports the results 
of the quantitative analysis.  
 
Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI), its determinants and consequences on economic growth in 
both developed and developing countries have been extensively researched in the academic 
milieu (see Dunning, 1998; Buckley, Clegg and Wang, 2007). The mainstream theoretical 
perspectives explaining why multinational firms engage in FDI range from the industrial 
organisation theory which focuses on a firm’s behaviour vis-à-vis its competitors (Caves, 
1971; Hymer, 1976); internalisation models based on market imperfections and the 
transaction cost economics explanation of the boundaries of the firm (Buckley and Casson, 
1976); to the electric paradigm (Dunning, 1988; Dunning, 1993) which provides a holistic 
approach to explain the levels and patterns of international production. In search for a more 
comprehensive understanding of what determines FDI, Dunning (1998) in his award winning 
article summarises the key antecedents of FDI and points out that while economic factors are 
important to FDI inflows, host country policies and institutions play more important role than 
they once did in the 1970s. Since Dunning’s (1998) influential article, a number of studies 
have focused on the role of government and host country institutions (see Henisz, 2000; 
Boateng and Glaister, 1999; Mmieh and Owusu-Frimpong, 2004; Du, Lu, and Tao, 2008; 
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Cleeve, 2012). These authors argue that institutions and government policies play 
increasingly significant role in explaining the location strategies of MNEs. For example, Du 
et al. (2008) note that the economic reforms, liberalization of FDI policies and institutional 
reforms in the emerging countries, particularly, Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) are 
widely seen as pivotal in attracting FDI inflows and constitute the driving force behind the 
economic development of these economies. Dunning (1998); Boateng et al. (2015) further 
contend that host country institutions and national policy environment may act as barriers to a 
firm’s location choice.   
 
The above argument is consistent with institutional theory which posits that a country’s 
institutions influence a firm’s strategic choices and competitiveness (North, 1990). Bad 
institutions and unfavourable government policies increase the cost of doing business in the 
host country while good institutions ensure effective functioning of market mechanisms and 
reduce risks (Meyer et al., 2009; Ang and Michailova, 2008). In order to attract foreign 
capital, many governments of sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) countries under the auspices of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have also changed their previous 
restrictive FDI policies to more liberal policies and embarked on massive reforms to attract 
FDI inflows. For instance, SSA countries have implemented Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) which includes liberalisation of FDI regulatory framework, privatisation 
and rationalisation of state owned enterprises as a condition to obtain financial support from 
the IMF and World Bank to revitalise their economies (Mmieh and Owusu-Frimpong, 2004; 
Cleeve, 2012).  
 
Despite the liberalisation of FDI policy environment coupled with abundance of natural 
resources such as oil, gold and other raw materials, SSA countries have attracted relatively 
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little FDI inflows compare to countries in Asia, America and Europe. According to the 
UNCTAD (2014), FDI inflows into SSA rose from US $1,689.7 million 1990 to US $42,371 
million in 2014. In comparison, FDI inflows in South East Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean have increased from US $12,820.8 million and US $8,536.8 million to US 
$132,867.2 million and US $159,404.9 million respectively in the same period. Clearly, SSA 
is at the bottom of FDI league table and the question as to why SSA continues to attract low 
levels of FDI is an important one often asked by academics and policy makers.  
The above is against the backdrop that relatively few studies investigate the effects of both 
government policies and institutions on FDI inflows in SSA (Boateng and Glaister, 1999; 
Asiedu, 2002; Cleeve, 2012; Ellis, Osabutey and Okoro, 2015). More importantly, with the 
exception of Boateng and Glaister (1999) in Ghana context, none of the above studies 
analyses directly the impact and effectiveness of specific government policies implemented 
over time and their association with FDI inflows. We believe that such qualitative analysis of 
government policies in conjunction with quantitative approach would provide a more 
insightful and inclusive account of what really attract FDI inflows to inform investment 
policy decisions in SSA. The goals of this study are two: (i) to analyse the impact and 
implications of government policies on the trends of FDI inflows; (ii) to examine the impact 
of home country institutions on FDI inflows. As the largest country in SSA with a huge 
market, Nigeria provides an ideal setting to demonstrate the impact of government policies 
and institutions on FDI. Nigeria is a major player in SSA and its population is over one-
quarter of the Sub-Saharan Africa’s population.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, the examination of 
government policies on FDI inflows in SSA is under-researched yet important to policy 
makers as lack of capital provided through FDI is one of the evidences of African poverty 
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(Boateng and Glaister, 1999). To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to examine the 
impact of host institutions and government policies using both quantitative approach and 
trend analysis in qualitative tradition to analyse the effects of institutions and government 
policies over such a long period of time, i.e., 1962 to 2012. The uniqueness of our data 
enables us to completely and robustly assess the effect of the policies on FDI inflows and 
draw more insightful conclusions. Overall, we demonstrate how host country government 
policies and institutions influence foreign firms’ decision to invest abroad thereby 
contributing to the institutional and location theories. Hoskisson, Eden, Lau and Wright 
(2000) note that the host country’s institutional influences on FDI have become an important 
empirical issue because of the changing institutions in emerging countries and the changing 
extent, character and geography of MNE activity over the past three decades. MNEs are 
increasingly seeking locations that offer the best institutional environments for their core 
competencies to be utilized efficiently and help developed their global firm-specific 
advantages (Dunning, 1998; Rugman and Verbeke, 2005). This study therefore highlights 
that, in their attempt to attract FDI inflows, African governments should not place exclusive 
reliance on profitability and availability of natural resources but should pay more attention to 
host country institutions and policies as they play important role in FDI inflows. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides theoretical background, 
delineates the government policies implemented in Nigeria over the past five decades and 
develops hypotheses of the study. Section 3 presents the sample selection and method used in 
this study followed by an analysis of the institutional determinants of FDI and trends of 
investment policies on FDI analysis. The final section concludes the paper and discusses the 





Theoretical Background: Government Reform Policies and Institutions  
Prior literature highlights the importance of location as a source of comparative advantage for 
multinational companies (Dunning, 1998). It is well documented that location captures the 
advantages and properties of the host country which makes the country in question attractive 
to potential foreign direct investors (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004). 
Specifically, researchers emphasise the host country factor endowment, policies and 
institutions which constitute immobile and created assets drive foreign investors in their 
location decisions. Despite this, the past empirical efforts have concentrated 
disproportionately on resource seeking and factor endowment (i.e., raw materials, labour 
costs, productivity and market size) aspects of host country location advantages of FDI 
(Dunning, 1998). However, it is argued that other than the relatively conventional ‘natural 
assets’, like raw materials or cheap labour, institutions and government policies now play 
increasingly significant role in explaining the location strategies of MNEs (Hoskisson et al., 
2000; Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004). Studies that investigate the host government policies 
and institutions are relatively scant and disagreements abound regarding which government 
policies and institutions matter for FDI inflows and why (see Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 
2004). It is therefore not surprising that, scholars have begun to refocus international business 
literature on spatial aspects, (particularly home and host country institutions) of FDI (Boateng 
et al., 2015).  
Institutions defined as ‘the rules of the game’ help shape the strategies, structures, and 
competitiveness of firms (North, 1990). Institutions reduce both transaction and information 
costs through minimizing uncertainty, ensures a stable structure that facilitates interaction and 
allows enterprises to move beyond institutional barriers (Oliver, 1991). Prior empirical 
studies support a view that government policies and regulative institutions in host countries 
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strongly influence on FDI inflows. For example, government policies and institutions which 
are ‘friendly’ towards foreign investors, such as the security of property rights, less 
ownership restriction, non-corrupt and less bureaucratic agencies, and low political risk are 
important in attracting FDI from MNEs (Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004; Grosse and Trevino, 
2005). In short, the overall thrust of the institution-based view is that a firm’s 
internationalization strategy is shaped by the institutional framework of the host country. 
Thus, institutions provide a framework for assessing a country’s strengths and weaknesses 
enabling foreign firms to capture the environmental complexity facing the MNCs for 
investment strategy formulation (Guisinger, 2001; Hoskisson et al., 2000). This is especially 
important because in developing countries, governments and institutions influences are 
stronger than in developed countries (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Du and Boateng, 2015). 
 
On the empirical front, a number of studies have examined the relationship between policy-
related variables and FDI inflows in advanced market and emerging countries, particularly, 
Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). For example, Brunetti and Weder (1998) 
investigated the link between institutional uncertainty and FDI and found a negative 
relationship between institutional uncertainty and private investment. Similarly, Bevan, Estrin 
and Meyer (2004) examined the relationship between institutional development and FDI 
inflows in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and documented that FDI is 
positively related to the quality of formal institutions. Other studies have examined 
corruption (Wei, 2000; Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashmova, 1998) and the influence of other 
policy-related variables of FDI such as political risk (Henisz, 2000); intellectual property 
protection (Lee and Mansfield, 1996); fundamental democratic rights (Jensen, 2003). In a 
more comprehensive treatment of the relationship between political risk, institutions and FDI 
inflows involving 83 developing countries over the 1984–2003 period, Busse and Hefeker 
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(2007) found government stability, internal and external conflict, corruption and ethnic 
tension, law and order, democratic accountability of government and quality of bureaucracy 
to be significant determinants of FDI. It is pertinent to point out that, the few studies which 
examine the influence of policy-related variables on FDI inflows in developing countries are 
based on cross-country studies with countries as diverse as China, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and 
Mexico being treated in an equal-weighted basis. It is argued that the results of these cross-
country studies may reflect other non-measurable influences that are different across 
countries (see Gastanaga et al., 1998) and may not give the full picture of the effects of 
institutions on FDI. This paper is different from prior studies as it utilises both quantitative 
and qualitative data analysis to unpack the influences of government policies and institutions 
on FDI inflows in the largest SSA country, that is, Nigeria. 
Table 1 delineates the development and changes in Nigerian government policies towards 
inward FDI over the period of 1962–2012 in five phases as follows. 
  
---Insert Table 1 here please--- 
Hypotheses Development 
Political instability 
Prior studies have documented that political stability creates a climate of confidence for 
foreign investors and increase FDI inflows. For example, Busse and Hefeker (2007) and 
Sanchez-Martín, De-Arce and Escribano (2014) found that government stability is positively 
associated with inward FDI. On the other hand, politically unstable countries are perceived as 
risky locations or unfavourable business environment because political volatility creates 
business uncertainties, acts as a barrier to FDI and increases the cost of doing business 
(Butler and Joaquin, 1998; Chakrabarti, 2001). High political risk means investors have little 
protection against breach of contracts or outright theft (Jensen and McGillivray, 2005). 
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Asiedu (2006); Solomon and Ruiz (2012) have rendered some support for the negative 
relationship between political instability and FDI. In the light of the above, we expect the 
political instability to reduce FDI inflows. We hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 1: Political instability is negatively related to FDI inflows. 
 
Corruption 
Prior studies have broadly categorised the effects of corruption on firms’ investment 
decisions into two competing hypothesis: the ‘helping hand’ theory (Lui, 1985; Saha, 2001) 
and the ‘grabbing-hand’ theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Aidt, 2003). The ‘helping-hand’ 
(efficiency enhancing) hypothesis contends that corruption could be an efficient tool against 
rigid economic regulations and red-tape (Lui, 1985; Saha, 2001). The argument here is that 
corruption has relatively low transaction costs compared to the benefits derived because 
corruption reduces delays involved in transacting businesses (Leff, 1964; Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006), and hence may increase FDI inflows. For example, Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) reported 
that corruption is beneficial in attracting FDI inflows in developing economies.  
On the other hand, the ‘grabbing–hand’ theory argues that corruption distorts the allocation of 
resources, increases transaction costs and discourages FDI (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; 
Barassi and Zhou, 2012). This argument supports the contention that corruption exerts a 
negative and significant impact on FDI inflows (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Javorcik and Wei, 
2009; Barassi and Zhou, 2012). However, Wheeler and Mody (1992) did not find a 
significant relationship between corruption and FDI inflows. The above arguments suggest 
that the effect of corruption on FDI remains an empirical question. Given that the 
Transparency International ranks corruption very high in most of the SSA countries, we 




Hypothesis 2: Corruption is negatively associated with FDI inflows. 
Democratic accountability 
Several studies have examined the relationship between democratic accountability and FDI. It 
is argued that democratically accountable governments have mechanisms that reduce 
arbitrary interventions, lower the risk of policy reversals and protect foreign investors (North 
and Weingast, 1989; Li, 2008). Some studies that have examined the relationship between 
democratic accountability and FDI report that democratic accountability exerts positive 
influence on FDI inflows (Jensen and McGillivray, 2005; Busse and Hefeker, 2007). Despite 
reforms in recent years, governance systems in SSA countries remain weak and Boateng and 
Glaister (1999) note that in SSA key policies can change at random without the government 
being held to account. Consequently, we hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 3: The level of democratic accountability is negatively related to FDI inflows. 
 
Rule of Law 
Rule of law ‘reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, particularly the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police and the courts, as well as likelihood of crime and violence’ (Bannaga et al., 2013, p. 
1247). Situations where the rules and regulations are enforced unpredictably and arbitrarily 
are a major concern for foreign investors (Drabek and Payne, 1999). Countries with better 
law and order tend to attract more FDI. Henisz and Zelner (2005) point out that rule of law 
tends to be relatively weak in many emerging economies. Uncertainties about law 
enforcement create a highly risky atmosphere for FDI (Bannaga et al., 2013).  
In the context of SSA countries, law enforcement appears weak - a factor attributed to 
corruption. For example, the US State Department (2015); Adegbite (2015) point out that law 
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enforcement in most African countries are weak, limited, inefficient, and remain a major 
challenge. Accordingly, we hypothesis that: 
Hypothesis 4: Weak rule of law is negatively associated with FDI inflows. 
 
Bureaucracy 
The quality of bureaucracy is closely associated with the institutional strength of a particular 
country. It is argued that low bureaucratic quality is expected to result in low FDI inflows 
(Busse and Hefeker, 2007). Thus, bureaucratic red tape increases transaction cost and 
adversely affect the relative competitiveness of firms operating in that country and deter FDI 
inflows (Ayal and Karras, 1996; Harding and Javorcik, 2011). In the context of SSA, the past 
20 years has seen several reforms in terms foreign investment approval processes, including 
the establishment of the Investment Promotion Centres to liberalise the foreign investment 
procedures and the adoption of structural adjustment programmes. For example, many SSA 
countries such as Ghana and Nigeria have replaced multiple agencies charged with foreign 
investment registration with one-stop-shop investment centre to facilitate the processing and 
issuing of necessary licenses/permits for business establishments (UNCTAD, 2009). We 
expect such reforms to reduce transaction costs associated with setting a business, thereby 
providing favourable environment for FDI inflows. Accordingly, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 5: The bureaucratic quality is positively associated with FDI inflows. 
 
Investment risk 
Investment risk is a measure of the factors affecting the risk to investments that are not 
covered by other political, economic and financial risk components (Sethi and Luther, 1986). 
It includes the threats of nationalisation or expropriation, changing the terms of agreements; 
threats of national government preventing a firm’s repatriation of profits and capital and 
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imposition of import and export controls (Jensen, 2008; Baek and Qian, 2011). Investment 
risk creates uncertain business environments for foreign investments (Butler and Joaquin, 
1998; Baek and Qian, 2011). Baek and Qian (2011) showed that, investment risk is a 
significant determinant of FDI in both industrialised and developing countries. Chan and 
Gemayel (2004) demonstrated that investment risk is crucial in explaining the levels of FDI 
inflows into Middle East and North Africa regions. According to Henisz and Delios (2001) 
where policy credibility is low (high investment risk), firms minimize commitments to a 
market, or avoid investment and the reverse is the case. 
However, Busse and Hefeker (2007) showed that investment risk is less of a significant 
determinant of inward FDI. This is in line with the argument that firms having relevant 
international experience will be less deterred by uncertain policy such as those that affect 
investment risk (see, Delios and Henisz, 2003). This is further supported by the fact that 
international expansion in the stages model is rooted in uncertainty reduction through the 
accumulation of relevant experience (Delios and Henisz, 2003). Thus, MNCs may with the 
passage of time, develop a strategy and ability to circumvent investment risk (see: Henisz, 
2000). The high-risk–high-return principle would suggest that experienced foreign investors 
can internalize their strategic assets around managing risk in countries with high investment 
risk to expand over the long term (Oh and Oetzel, 2016). 
The partnership option of the indigenisation policy in Nigeria and other African countries 
mitigates the threats of nationalisation in the host countries (see Williamson, 1985). 
Moreover, the bilateral investment promotion and protection agreements (IPPAs) with many 
countries provide guarantees against expropriation, arbitrary change of the terms of contracts 
and a ban on repatriation of capital and profits (See, Spiller and Tommasi, 2005). Most SSA 
governments have committed themselves to attract foreign investment and have entered into 
bilateral and multilaterial agreements to safeguard FDI in their respective host countries 
12 
 
(UNCTAD, 2009). Therefore, we expect a reduction in investment risks to attract more FDI 
inflows in SSA and this leads to our sixth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6: Low investment risk is positively associated with FDI inflows. 
 
Control variable 
We control the inflation rate, total oil export and total oil trade. Inflation rate have been found 
to have a significant bearing on FDI inflows (Boateng et al., 2015). On the other hand, 
Nigeria depends mainly on revenue from the sale of natural resources (petroleum and gas 
product). While oil export and oil total revenue too have significant impact on the economy 
particularly that some of the investment policy changes were made at the time when revenue 
earning from sale of petroleum and gas changed. More so, natural resources have been found 
to have significantly positive relationship with FDI (Asiedu, 2002). 
 
Data and Methodology 
Data and Measurement of Variables 
We draw our data on institutional variables from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
index of the Political Risk Service (PRS) group. The description of the institution variables in 
this study follows. Political stability measures how stable a government is, based on its ability 
to carry out declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is 
the sum of three sub-components - government unity, legislative strength and popular 
support, each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. Thus 
government stability is 0 (high risk) -12 (low risk) scale (PRS group, 2012). Bureaucratic 
quality is a shock absorber that tends to minimise revisions of policy when governments 
change. The rating range from 12 (low-risk:  where the bureaucracy has the strength and 
expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services) 
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to 0 (high-risk: lack of cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy because a change in 
government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day 
administrative functions) (PRS group, 2012). 
The rule of law variable measures the impartiality of the legal system and the extent it is 
enforced. The rating range from 0 - 6, a high rating implies impartiality and it is relatively 
reliable (PRS group, 2012). Corruption is an assessment of corruption within the political 
system, a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and 
financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling 
people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and, lastly 
introduces an inherent instability into the political process. The rating is from 0 (high-risk) to 
6 (low-risk) (PRS group, 2012). Democratic accountability is a measure of how responsive 
government is to its people, on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is that 
the government will fall peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-
democratic one. In general, the high score is assign to low risk and low score is assigned to 
high-risk. The rating is from 0-12 scale (PRS group, 2012). Investment risk measure assesses 
factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic and 
financial risk components. The risk rating assigned is scale on 0 (high risk) -12 (low risk) 
(PRS Group, 2012). 
The dependent variable, FDI are the inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 per cent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise in a foreign country. It is the 
sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, rights and other long-term capital as shown 
in the balance of payments (UNCTAD, 2015). FDI inflows in US dollars were extracted from 
the World Investment Report. The control variables: total oil export in billions of Naira and 
oil total revenue in billions of Naira was extracted from the Central Bank of Nigeria 
Statistical Bulletin and NIBS; inflation rate is the consumer price index (annual %) from 
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World Development Indicator. Regarding the government’s regulatory policies towards FDI, 
we draw the information from the relevant decrees including NIPC decree, companies’ code, 
National development Plan; Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) of 1972/1977 and 
various World Investment Reports produced by UNCTAD. 
 
Methodology 
To examine the effects of government policies and institutions on FDI, we utilise both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative approach employ co-integration 
regression, namely, canonical co-integration regression (CCR) and fully modified ordinary 
least square (FMOLS). The approaches modify the least squares to account for serial 
correlation effects and the endogeneity in the regressors.  FMOLS and CCR estimators are 
obtained by transforming the regressors and regressand and then the ordinary least square 
procedures are applied (Wang and Wu, 2012). The estimators are asymptotically unbiased 
and have fully efficient normal asymptotic, allowing for standard Wald tests using asymptotic 
chi-squared statistical inference free from nuisance parameters (Park, 1992; Phillips, 1995). 
The models use all variables as endogeneous and minimise endogeneity bias (Park, 1992, 
Wang and Wu, 2012). They produce estimates of a unit root in time series regression that are 
hyper-consistent in the sense that their rate of convergence exceeds that of the OLS estimator 
(Phillip, 1995). However, due to dearth of data, the quantitative analysis is limited to the 
period from 1984 to 2012.We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) to test the level of 
stationarity. A time series data that are non-stationary tends to have a long-run 
stable/equilibrium relationship between the variables and can be co-integrated (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2010). To avoid co-integrating a non-stationary data, we use the Johansen tests for co-
integration to test the null hypothesis (r = 0) of having no co-integrating vector against the 
alternative hypothesis (r = 1) of having, at least, one co-integrating vector. We also use the 
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trace tests and where the trace statistics (λ trace) are larger than their respective critical values 
at 5%, we reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration vector and accepts the alternative 
hypothesis of, at least, one co-integrating vector (rank 1), indicating that there is a long run 
relationship among the variables.  
The qualitative approach involves examining the trends and patterns of FDI inflows in 
relationship with the investment policy at the specific investment policy phase. The trend 
analysis enables us to relate the various policies to the rise and fall of FDI inflows in terms of 
their annual growth rate and cumulative annual growth rate over a long period of time. A 
number of studies including Boateng and Glaister (1999); Tripathy, Yadav and Sharma, 
(2011); Zheng, (2013) have used such approach to analyse the FDI inflows. We compare the 
results from the qualitative approach to the result of the quantitative approach to draw our 
conclusions. 
Estimation model 
Our estimation model is: 
LFDI1i = β0 + β1PolS + β2Cor + β3DemA + β4Law + β5Bur + β6InvR + β7InfR + β8LOEx + ε  (1) 
LFDI1i = β0 + β1PolS + β2Cor + β3DemA + β4Law + β5Bur + β6InvR + β7InfR + β8LOTr + ε  (2) 
Where: LFDI1i and LFDI1i = log of FDI, β0 = constant term, β1 to β6 are independent variables, 
β7 to β8 are the control variables and ε = error term. PolS = Political stability, Cor = 
corruption, DemA = democratic accountability, Law = rule of law, Bur = Bureaucratic 
quality, InvR = investment rate, InfR = inflation rate, LOTr = log of total oil trade and LOEx 
= log of total oil export. FMOLS and CCR will be separately used to analyse each model. 





 – 1 
Where in each investment policy phase; g = annual growth rate, n = number of years, 𝑙𝑣 = 
latest value of FDI inflows and 𝑒𝑣 = earliest value of FDI inflows. 
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Results and Discussion 
Unit root and co–integration test 
Unit root test 
The unit root test (ADF and Philip Perron tests) results are reported in Table 2. The table 
indicates that except bureaucratic quality which is stationary using Philip-Perron test, the rest 
of variables are not stationary. At first difference, all variables are stationary, and thus are 
integrated at order 1. Therefore, there is a possibility of co-integration among the variables 
and co-integration regression. 
 




First, we assessed the optimal lags length that would give normal error terms to be included 
in the Johansen co-integration test using trace (λ trace) statistics. In model 1, except Schwarz 
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) which favours the inclusion of 2 lags in Johansen co-
integration test, the other information criteria favour the inclusion of 1 lag in Johansen co-
integration test. In model 2, all information criteria favour the inclusion of 2 lags in Johansen 
co-integration test. 
---Insert Tables 3 & 4 here please--- 
 
Table 4 presents the Johansen tests for co-integration results using lag 1 in all model. Starting 
with the null hypothesis that there are no co-integrating vectors (r = 0), the results show that 
at 5% significance level, the trace statistics (λ trace) are larger than their respective critical 
values up to rank 2 in both models. This suggests that the variables are co-integrated with up 
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to rank 3 in both models. The models reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration vector 
and we accepts the alternative hypothesis of at least one co-integrating vector (rank 1), 
indicating there is a long-run relationship among the variables. 
 
Regression results 
Having confirmed long-run/equilibrium relationships among the variables, CCR and the 
FMOLS models were used for the analysis. The results are shown in table 5. The independent 
and control variables in the models have similar signs and relationships with FDI. 
 
---Insert Table 5 here please--- 
 
Table 5 shows that the institutional factors in both models (FMOLS and CCR) explain about 
94 per cent of the variation of FDI inflows in Nigeria. The results indicate that political 
instability (β = -0.3103452; p<0.00) and democratic accountability (β = -0.1866218; p<0.05) 
have negative and significant relationship with FDI inflows while low investment risk (β = 
0.38066127; p<0.00) exerts positive and significant effect on FDI inflows. Thus the results of 
both FMOLS and CCR models provide support for hypotheses 1, 3 and 6. However, the 
results indicate that the coefficients for corruption, rule of law and bureaucratic quality are 
not significant and therefore hypotheses 2, 4 and 5 are not supported. Regarding the control 
variables, the coefficient for inflation appears not to have a significant impact on FDI inflows 
while oil exports and oil revenue have significant positive impact on FDI. 
The negative and significant relationship between political instability and FDI inflows 
appears consistent with our expectation and is in line with the results of Solomon and Ruiz 
(2012) who found that political instability reduces FDI inflows. The results also show that 
democratic accountability has a negative and statistically significant effect on FDI inflows. 
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The results suggest that democratic accountability is important for explaining FDI inflows. 
The results, however, appear inconsistence with previous studies of Jensen (2003); Busse and 
Hefeker (2007) which that shows democratic accountability exert positive influence on FDI 
inflows. Regarding the relationship between investment risk and FDI inflows, our results are 
in line with that of Baek and Qian (2011) and Chan and Gemayel (2004) who found 
investment risk to be a significant determinant of FDI. Perhaps the promulgation of the NIPC 
Decree 16 of 1995 and adoption of SAP which reversed the indigenisation policy and 
abolished exchange foreign controls, threats of nationalisation and expropriation of foreign 
investments in Nigeria may explain the results. It was expected that corruption, rule of law, 
and bureaucratic quality would exert negative and significant effect on FDI but this appears 
not to be the case.  
 
Qualitative Results: Investment policies and trends of FDI (1962–2012) 
The results regarding the impact of the foreign investment policy changes on trends of FDI 
inflows are reported in table 6. Using the nature of the foreign investment policies 
implemented in Nigeria from 1962-2012, we classified the policies into three phases, namely 
the limited promotion investment policy (1962–1969); the restrictive foreign investment 
policy (1970–1985); and the liberal investment policy phase (1986-2012), implemented over 
time periods of (1986–1994) representing the first investment policy reforms through the 
introduction of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP); and (1995–2012) represents the 
second stage of investment reforms aimed at reversing completely indigenisation policies; 
privatisation, adoption of good corporate governance practices and fiscal responsibility. The 
table shows that the liberal policy phase has the highest cumulative growth over the period of 
1986-2012 of 32.43%. A further analysis of the period of 1986-2012 sub-divided into two 
time periods of 1986-1994 and 1995-2012, indicate that, a cumulative growth of 53.12% and 
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16.98% were recorded in 1986-1994 and 1995-2012 periods respectively. In comparison to 
the limited promotion and restrictive periods of 1962-1969 and 1970-1985, the cumulative 
growth rates of FDI were 13.63% and 8.45% respectively. The results may be explained by 
the fact that, FDI transactions under the liberal policy phase are less associated with 
cumbersome regulation and delays in approval procedures (Uche, 2012; World Bank, 1994). 
This suggests that liberal phase led to economic efficiency by increasing market access, 
reduced tariff barriers and non-friendly policies imposed on foreign investments. The reforms 
allowed free movement of capital and retention of exporters’ earnings in foreign currencies 
thereby increasing FDI inflows. In contrast, restrictive and limited promotion regimes 
hindered FDI inflows. Overall, the results of this study suggest that liberal government 




Our findings have important practical and policy implications for senior managers and policy 
makers. First, the results of this study imply that government policies and host country 
institutions play an important role in shaping not only foreign investors’ international 
expansion strategies but also their location decisions in the host country. More importantly, 
the study demonstrates that FDI inflows are partly a function of the level of government 
policies and institutions in the host country. Therefore, in order to attract foreign capital into 
African countries, governments in SSA should look beyond the sheer endowment and 
abundance of natural resources such as oil, gold and other raw materials and pay equal 
attention to the policies and the quality of their institutions. This is because poor institutions 
and bad government investment policies increase the cost of doing business in the host 
country while good institutions ensure effective functioning of market mechanisms and 
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reduce risks. Therefore we suggest that SSA governments should take further steps to 
improve accountability, minimise bureaucracy, create stable political institutions and reduce 
investment risk to attract more FDI inflows. Another important area that policy makers in 
SSA need to pay more attention is to improve further the overall legal environment, 
particularly the law enforcement to help reduce transaction costs and encourage 
personal/private investors seeking opportunities to grow in SSA countries.  
Second, the findings of this study also imply that senior managers charged with the 
responsibility of making international expansion decisions should not focus on the 
availability of natural resources but should also pay attention to the host country investment 
policies and institutions that enable their firms to reduce cost and gain competitive advantage. 
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that host country government policies can 
influence MNE investment decision making and strategies thereby supporting the political 
economy view and institutional theory of FDI which indicate that government and host 
country policies environment matter for a firm’s investment strategies.  
 
---Insert Table 6 here please--- 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The study has analysed the impact of government policies and home country institutions on 
FDI inflows in Nigeria. The study is one of the first attempts to examine the trends and effect 
of government policies on FDI in sub-Saharan Africa using a data which spans from 1962-
2012 and employing both qualitative and quantitative approaches. First, the impact of 
institutions on FDI inflows was examined by adopting the CCR and FMOLS regression 
models. The study shows that the institutions constitute important determinants of inward 
FDI in Nigeria. Specifically, the results of the study show that political instability and 
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democratic accountability exert negative and significant impact on inward FDI in Nigeria 
while investment risk has positive and significant bearing on FDI in Nigeria. However, the 
impact of corruption, rule of law and bureaucratic quality on FDI are negative and 
insignificant. Second, the foreign investment policies employed in Nigeria from 1962 were 
grouped into three phases: the limited promotion investment policy (1962–1968), the 
restrictive practice investment policy (1970–1985), and the liberal investment policy (1986–
2012). The impact and implications of the government investment policies were analysed by 
relating the investment policies to the trends of FDI inflows. Our results indicate that the 
liberal investment policy phase attracted more FDI inflows compared to other phases. This is 
followed by the limited promotion investment policy phase with the restrictive investment 
policy phase being the one which brings in the least FDI inflows.  
Although this study focuses on Nigeria, the findings have implications for other SSA 
countries given the similarity of institutions and government policies in Africa. While this 
study contributes to the growing stream of research on developing and emerging countries, 
this study has a limitation in respect of the use of unbalanced data for our analysis. While the 
qualitative analysis of government spans from 1962-2012 due to unavailability of data, the 
quantitative analysis is for a period of 1984-2012. Further research appears warranted if more 
data becomes available. Future studies should also examine comparative data involving a 
cross section of African and Asian countries to provide insightful comparisons between the 
effects of institutions and government policies on FDI inflows. 
Acknowledgement: We would like to thank Dr Mary Teagarden (editor) and the two 
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                                               Table 1. FDI-related Policy changes in Nigeria 
Phases    Reform policy 




 This was during the First National Development Plan (NDP) in 1962–1968 
aimed at developing infrastructural facilities to enhance foreign investments, 
broaden the base of the economy and limit the risk of over-dependence on 
foreign trade and to put the economy on fast growth path. It was majorly 
affected by the Nigerian civil war from 1967-1970. The major features are: 
 Establishment of Exchange Control Act of 1962: Imposed restrictions on the 
amount of foreign exchange that can be repatriated by foreign investors. 
 Expatriate Quota Allocation Board was established in 1966. The board was 
charged to ensure greater indigenous participation in the control, development 
and management of certain economic resources in Nigeria. Protection of local 
investments and industries through tariffs, quotas and licensing. 
 Implementation of investment incentives such as: pioneer certificates which 
allowed foreign investors to enjoy numerous tax reliefs, custom and excise duty 
reliefs (import duty relief) on imported industrial machineries, spare parts and 
raw materials. 
  Custom tariff structure were deliberately biased in favour of capital goods and 
raw materials while luxury goods were either purposely put on import 





 Nigeria had three development plans during this phase. The second National 
Development Plans (1970-1974) was launched primarily to reconstruct and 
rehabilitate infrastructure damaged during the civil war; the third National 
Development Plan (1975-1980) which was designed under the era of World oil 
prices boom; and fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985) which was 
affected by the collapse of World oil prices and decline in oil generated 
revenue. Government introduced Economic Stabilization Act to ameliorate the 
impact of oil price fall aimed at reducing government expenditure. Its features 
include: 
 Foreign exchange and trade barriers such as import licensing controls 
intensified in 1971–1972 to support import substitution industrialisation policy. 
In between this phase, 1975-1980, exchange control was reduced and 
restrictions on import payment were abandoned and additional incentives for 
fast depreciation allowance on capital goods were granted to foreign firms. 
 Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) of 1972 also known as 
indigenisation policy, which limited equity ownership of foreign investors to a 
maximum of 60 per cent and reserve some business sectors for Nigerians while 
the foreign entrepreneurs were left with businesses requiring higher technology 
and capital outlays. It was aimed to accelerate indigenisation, by restricting 
activities of foreign investors. 
 1977: The indigenisation policy decree amended to further limit foreign equity 
participation in Nigeria business, and expanding the list of activities exclusively 
reserved to Nigerian investors; lowering permitted foreign participation in the 
FDI-restricted activities from 60 to 40 per cent, and adding new activities 
restricted to 40 per cent foreign ownership and creating a second list of business 
activities were permitted foreign investments was reduced from 100 to 60 per 
cent ownership. 
 




 Prior to 1986, Nigeria has been adopting medium term development plans as 
framework for development. The policy features during the era were: 
 Introduction of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 under the 
auspices of IMF. The SAP simplified the regulatory environment and attempted 
removing cumbersome administrative controls and create market friendly 
environment. SAP introduced liberalisation such as: the elimination of import 
tariffs, export taxes and import quotas, liberalisation of prices and trade, and 




 Started the removal of the ownership limitations on foreign investment under 
the 1972 and 1977 indigenisation policy decrees, reduced corporate tax rates, 
and introduced a debt-equity conversion programme in Nigeria. 
 
 Creation of the Industrial Development Coordinating Committee (IDCC) in 
1988: Established the one-shop agency to facilitate foreign investors’ 
registration and their investments into Nigeria. IDCC replaced the NEPD of 
1972 and 1977. 
 
 The National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) 
Decree No. 82 of 1992. Established to coordinate FDI involving technology 
transfer contracts with local firms in the areas of industrial property rights, 
technical assistance, and other commercial technology transactions. Agreements 
on technology transfer to submit to NOTAP for evaluation before such 
agreements could be implemented in Nigeria. 
 




 This era relaxed the indigenisation policy of 1972 and 1977 and with the return 
of democracy in 1999, there were reforms aimed to address the distortion in the 
economy. Some of its major features were: 
 Decree 16 of 1995 established the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
(NIPC) and repealed the IDCC decree No. 36 of 1988 and the indigenisation 
policy. Reversed the restrictions on foreign investment equity ownership limit. 
NIPC provided for foreign investors to set up a business in Nigeria in all sectors 
(except for a short negative list: including drugs and arms) up to 100 per cent 
ownership rights with exception of the petroleum sector where foreign 
investment is limited to JV. NIPC guaranteed foreign investments from 
nationalisation or expropriation, streamlined registration procedures by 
providing one-stop-shop. 
 
 Decree 17 of 1995 established the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and 
Miscellaneous Provision) Act. The decree permitted free repatriation of 
dividends accruing from such investment or of capital in an event of sales or 
liquidation of business (net of taxes). The decree allows foreign investors to 
bring in or take out their capital through an authorised dealer who issues a 
certificate of capital importation to the investors as evidence of the funds that 
have been brought into the country to qualify for repatriation and permitted 
foreign investor to open a foreign currency domiciliary account with any 
authorised dealer for investment purposes. 
 
 Decree, No. 28 of 1999 form the legal framework for the privatisation of Public 
Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation). 
 
 ICPC was created in 2000 to assist in fighting corruption. 
 




 Nigeria adopted the National Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy (NEEDS) in 2003. NEEDS made FDI attraction an explicit goal for the 
government. Further policy reforms from 2003 saw the need to fight corruption; 
enshrine a culture of transparency, good governance and fiscal responsibility, 
and to protect foreign investment. 
 
 Privatisation of public enterprise, tax reform to reduce tax burden, trade 
liberalisation and the abandonment of trade regulation, free determined exchange 
rate and security of property rights. 
 
 EFCC was established in 2004 to assist in fighting corruption. 
Notes: Compilation by authors based on various laws/decrees and literature from Analogbei (2000); Ukaegbu 
(1991); Banjoko et al. (2012); Uche (2012); Coker et al. (2012); (Ismaila, 1985; Ogbuagu (1982); UNCTAD 







Table 2: Unit Root Test 
 ADF Philip Perron  
Order of 
Integration 




Log of FDI -2.029 -11.440* -1.940 -11.018* I(1) 
Political stability -1.060 -3.621* -1.379 -3.647* I(1) 
Corruption -1.060 -3.621* -1.379 -3.647** I(1) 
Democratic Accountability -2.196 -5.137* -2.140 -5.184* I(1) 
Rule of law -1.572 -3.186** -1.789 -3.183** I(1) 
Bureaucratic quality -2.535 -4.763* -2.657*** -4.783* I(1) 
Investment risk -2.281 -5.830* -2.355 -5.809* I(1) 
Inflation, CP (annual %) -2.482 -4.635* -2.457 -4.610* I(1) 
Log  of oil export and re-export -1.473 -6.134* -1.929 -6.301* I(1) 
Log of total oil revenue -1.533 -6.212* -2.037 -6.356* I(1) 




















Table 3: Selection-order criteria  
Lag LL LR df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
Model 1 
0 –295.784    0.051612 –3.63096 –3.63096 –3.63096 
1 –85.7573 420.05* 81 0.000 5.1e-06 –13.1885* –12.0325* –9,30099* 
2 . . 81 . -8.2e
-23
* . . . 
 Endogenous: LFDI PolS Cor DemA Law Bur InfR InvR LOEx; Exogenous: _cons 
 Model 2 
0 -295.685    0.051234 -3.63832 -3.63832 -3.63832 
1 -83.8305 423.71 81 0.000 4.4e
-06
 -13.3312 -12.1753 -9.44372 
2 563.087 1293.8* 81 0.000 4.3e
-23
* -55.251* -52.9391* -47.476* 








Table 4: Result of Johansen tests for co-integration   
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2  
 PARMS LL Eigenvalue Trace 
statistics 





r = 0 9 -235.01515 . 266.5484 -223.54774  266.8356 192.89 
r ≤ 1 26 -189.63286 0.96090 175.7838 -187.37028 0.96306 174.4807 156.00 
r ≤ 2 41 -165.48718 0.82177 127.4925 -162.8054 0.82703 125.3509 124.24 
r ≤ 3 54 -147.51208 0.72305 91.5423* -145.04679 0.71874 89.8337* 94.15 
r ≤ 4 65 -132.08988 0.66766 60.6978 -129.78432 0.66384 59.3087 68.52 
r ≤ 5 74 -120.46425 0.56413 37.4466 -118.51753 0.55281 36.7752 47.21 
r ≤ 6 81 -109.50483 0.54288 15.5278 -107.59093 0.54181 14.9220 29.68 
r ≤ 7 86 -104.95957 0.27723 6.4372 -103.19864 0.26929 6.1374 15.41 
r ≤ 8 89 -102.69717 0.14922 1.9124 -100.99129 0.14587 1.7227 3.76 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Relationship between Investment Policy Phases and Inward FDI in 
 Nigeria  
Investment Policy Oil Sector (%) Non-Oil Sector (%) Total (%) 
Limited Promotion (1962-1969) * * 13.63 
Restrictive Practices (1970-1985) 5.30 9.40 8.45 
 
Liberal and Reforms 
1986-2012 32.84 31.77 32.43 
1986-1994 59.69 37.18 53.12 
1995-2012 15.69 20.23 16.98 
Notes: Source: Compiled by Authors based on CBN database.                                                           
*=No disaggregated data for FDI inflows for the period.                                                 
 
